OUR ESTABLISHMENT IN THE ATSJIN (Aceh/Achin/Acheh/اچيه) RICH - THE SUMATRA TRAKTAAT

At first it seemed as if the Aceh Tract would produce the desired outcomes. At least, in the first three years that followed the conclusion of our agreement, we had every reason to rejoice over the new state of affairs. But in 1860 another series of annoying events began, which finally dissolved in the war. I will now pass on to giving an oversight of animal events. Do not think Countrymen! that I will use my secrets. The facts, which I am going to tell, have not happened in any corner. They have seen many eyes; she has described many pen; and our archives, both in India and in the Netherlands, preserve the undeniable history of this.

The Sultan of Aceh had appointed a certain Radja Oedah, as guardian of his Vassal, had minor Head of Kloeang This Radja Oedah left, in 1860, two ships older Dutch flag, and to Aceh, from where, on the advice of Sultan, secretly removed. The owners of these ships naturally turned to the Indian Government, with a request for compensation; and the Indian Government naturally turned to the Sultan of Aceh with a request for reparation.

The Sultan began to acknowledge with the fairness of our request. He even began to dismiss Radja Oedah, as guardian of his minors Vassal, with actual factual evidence. But he ended up withdrawing from the compensation he never paid. The result was that we ended up taking the compensation for our account; and to refrain from any further treatment of this matter, which necessarily led to war, which was forbidden by the London Tractate.

This ostensible proof of our inadequacy, to maintain the Aceh Tract, was, of course, sufficient for Aceh to be able to afford several, and more and more, more serious violations of this tract. Aceh did not fail to do so. Here is how Aceh proceeded.

In the year 1862, the Sultan of Aceh sent a proposal to the Indian Government to settle the boundaries between his territory and ours. The Indian Government devoted itself to accepting and accepting this proposal. But now the Sultan hastened to evade the execution of his proposal. Soon it turned out, what intention the Sultan had with a proposal, the execution of which he did not wish. The Sultan wanted to take the appearance, as if he were unfamiliar with the boundaries of our territory, in order to be able to commit his inhuman arbitrariness to the native population, also on our land. The following events do not reveal that intention of the Sultan unclearly.

In 1857 the Empire of Siak had offered us Sovereignty over its provinces. In 1858 we accepted that Sovereignty. From 1858 onwards, the Siak Empire belonged to our territory.

Now in 1863, Batu Bara, a landscape of the Empire of Siak, was shot at by Acehnese vessels, while the Dutch flag of the fortifications established there was blowing. The Indian Government asked the Sultan of Aceh for clarification. The Sultan replied that the shelling of Batu Bara had taken place at his expense, because the population of this region, which he counted to his territory, had not wanted to pay an imposed estimate.

At about the same time, Acehnese settled on the Siakic island of Kampei, so on our territory. They plundered everything that came in their vicinity. The Resident of Riau proceeded with two steamships from there. He actually found Acehnese located in a fortification where the Aceheesche flag had been hoisted. The head of the Acehnese refused a meeting with the Resident, who was forced to lay down a written warning, not to commit hostilities on the Dutch territory, nor to build reinforcements.

In the same year 1863, in which both events took place, Acehnese forced to send an expedition to Nias, an island belonging to our Government on the west coast of Sumatra. The Acehnese, namely, carried out the slave trade there on a large scale. They did so under such circumstances, so disgraceful, so horrible that humanity can not but abhor it. Our expedition had as its goal, in order not to abolish this abominable human-robbery and trade, if not at all. We found, however, that the Acehnese, on our own territory, strengthened so much, that our enterprise ended in vain. A second expedition was the necessary consequence of this. Although it succeeded better, nevertheless, since we have been obliged to keep the population of our native islands, we have been continually protecting Sumatra by means of our Zeemagt against the people of the Acehnese.

Also in Tamian, also a landscape of Siak, so also our territory, Acehnese had established themselves. They killed, in 1864, some Chinese who had come there to trade. The Chinese belonged to Poeloe Penang, and were therefore British subjects. The British Government, therefore, wanted to punish that crime. We succeeded, however, in making her decide to leave that task to us, so that we were spared the possible evil consequences of a strange intervention. We started our task, of course, with the head of Tamian to account. But he refused to speak to us, saying that he was wearing the Acehnese flag, and that the Acehnese were not used to exposing their affairs to others.

Like Tamian, Assahan and Serdang, also landscapes of Siak, were persuaded by the Acehnese to public resistance against us. The attitude of the provinces became so hostile and so agonizing that we were compelled to send an expedition. This happened in 1865. On that occasion the armed forces of the Acehnese were expelled from our territory. We also succeeded in discovering and defeating two of the murderers whom the Chinese of Poeloe Penang had diverted.

In the same year 1865, while the Acehnese made our expedition to the east coast of Sumatra necessary, they also forced an expedition to the west coast of our island. An Acehnese , called Tukoe Saïd, demanded, on behalf of the Sultan of Aceh, an estimate of the population in the Upperlands of Singkel. 1 One of the native heads of Singkel, made a sore affair with him. And soon arose, on our territory, Acehnese reinforcements, which had to be taken and destroyed by our armed power.



In 1866 the Acehnese committed alder hostilities on our territory. They attacked the Siak Karang, just because the heads of that kampong had paid tribute to the Indian Government, their legitimate Sovereign. Fortunately, our officials were able to restore peace, so that sending another expedition was unnecessary.

Let us now stand still for a moment at the events we have discussed.

That bombardment of Batu Bara; that branch on Kampei, and the scenes of looting, which took place in the vicinity of this island; those people-robbery, with an aftermath of geese, on Nias and surrounding islands; that murder at Tamian; that revolt of Assahan and Serdang; that resistance in the upperlands of Singkel; that attack on Karang - they were all acts of barbaric violence, committed by Aceh not on their own, but on our territory. We have therefore sent four expeditions. Not, to wage war against Aceh. Because this was forbidden by the London Traktaat. But to protect our own country and people, against the assault of the predatory Aceh. Our weapons remained within the limits of our territory. They did not continue. Were they not fair, those measures of mere self-defense? Certainly the history of the world does not provide a second example of so much concordance. with so much violation of States and Nations, as we have shown to Aceh.

However, the Sultan of Aceh thought differently. He could not bear to prevent our people from robbing and killing on our land. Our measures made him dissatisfied. They even drove him to enmity towards us. He soon found an opportunity to make it public. In 1867 he refused to answer the letter, whereby the Indian Government, according to courteous custom, brought the arrival of a Governor-General to his knowledge.

In the following year 1868, the Sultan of Aceh showed us his enmity in a way that could have caused us great harm. He then called in the help of the Turkish Government against us, and also asked the Sultan of Turkey to accept sovereignty over the Kingdom of Aceh. Had the Great Lord accepted this offer, the disastrous consequences would not have been overseen. Fortunately, Turkey continued to determine to send a diplomatic note requesting the Dutch Government to clarify our relationship with Aceh.

In the same year of 1868, the insecurity, in the waters and on the shores of Aceh, became so great that the Governor of the Straits Settlements, the people of his territory, in proclamation, had to warn against the danger with which persons and goods were there. threatened.

In 1870 the robberies of the Atjinians made the situation as shameful as unsustainable. If we want to be able to form a state-of-the-art idea, we must take note of the English daily newspapers, namely Penang Gazette and Straits Observer, which were published in that year. The Governor of the Straits Settlements was compelled to openly warn against the danger to which trade and shipping had been exposed. True to the principles of the London treatise, he ended his proclamation with the statement that the English Government could not help. But now, too, bitterness arose among the English, who needed help, and who had to miss the help of their Government, for the sake of the Netherlands, which did not help. Voices rose from all sides, urging urgently to powerful English intervention.

Under such circumstances, the Netherlands had to seriously question what it had to do. Would we go on any longer, submit to the demands of the London Tractate, which demanded our security for Trade and Shipping, and yet forbade us the war with the robbery Aceh? But that was not possible. An experience of fifty years had shown the complete impossibility of it. Discourses, requests, demands, promises, threats, magical treats, means of moral coercion, with one word, all possible peace-loving attempts, to bring Aceh back from his predatory desire, had no benefit. They had only served to finally create a state of affairs, which the whole civilized world was annoyed about, and which threatened our country with gross dangers. Would we then abandon our guardianship over Aceh?



But that was not possible either. Safety for Trade and Shipping had to exist. She was eagerly demanded by every trading power. She could not exist, however, when Aceh was without custody, and consequently retained opportunity to celebrate his robbery and murder. Did we therefore abandon the guardianship, another power would undoubtedly take care of it. And so we would return to that earlier situation, when we had to share the possession of Sumatra with another state, a situation so full of worries and dangers, that every Dutchman, who loves his colonies and his homeland, must be deeply averse to it. feeling.

The way we had to follow to get out of our thorny circumstances was therefore clearly indicated. We had to keep the guardianship of Aceh, and we ought to release her from the impossible conditions imposed upon her by the London Traktaat.

And that is why, on the 2 nd November 1871, we concluded an agreement with England, which is known under the name of Sumatra-Traktaat. We handed over to England the possessions which we had on the African coast of Guinóa. And England joined together to refrain from any interference with our affairs in Sumatra from now on.

Thus we were finally released from the untenable situation in which the London Tractate had placed us. But at the same time we were in a serious state that would decide our future. Since England had renounced his possessions in Sumatra, since 1824, we, we alone, in the trading powers, were responsible for the security in our Archipelago. Until now, we have always been short of that obligation. America, Italy, England, and the people of our own area, had experienced this through the events of which we have provided oversight. The whole world had heard this from the proclamations of the Governor of the Straits Settlements. But we were always apologetic, appealing to the London Tractate, which limited our actions. Now, however, it had become different. The London Tract was destroyed; we now had free disposal of all our resources. It would henceforth be evident whether or not we were able to ensure the safety of our Archipelago in order to meet the legal and strict requirements of the trading powers. If Aceh still continued, to be detrimental to the security in our Archipelago, we would have to confess that we were impotent to bring Aceh to duty. We would then have to approve that the restraint of Aceh was entrusted to more powerful hands than ours. In other words, we should then see to it that the end of our reign over Insulinde began. Because, Countrymen! remember, if we share our authority in the Indies with a great power, then the end of our authority in India also begins. In order to see this truth clearly, we only have to pay attention to the great experience of daily life. We would see, blind; hearing, deaf; living, death must be if we wanted to claim otherwise.

The Sumatra-Tractate, therefore, had complicated Aceh in question, reduced to the following simple form.

There had to be an end to the robbery and murders of Aceh, who brought grievous misery about the Indonesian population; that hindered trade and shipping; and those of the whole civilized world were a great annoyance.

There was an immediate end to it. Our existence as colonial power was involved.

An experience of fifty years had shown that Atsin was impossible to enforce with words. From now on, no more words, but deeds.

I am now going to tell you how our Aceh problem has been solved, as stated.

(Continued)