THE Aceh TRAKTAAT
THE Aceh TRAKTAAT
Countrymen! in order to judge, about the necessity or necessity of our war against Aceh, we must of course be known:
1. with the causes which led to the war;
2. with the circumstances under which the war started and conducted; and
3. with the consequences that this war can bring.
I will endeavor, in order to show you a few things in advance.
In the year 1857 we concluded a Traktaat with Aceh. I must begin by telling you the history of this tract. For her knowledge is absolutely necessary, in order to be able to judge with accuracy the events and conditions which at last have created our war.
When, after the fall of France's first Emperor, we returned to the line of independent states, we had to possess the island of Sumatra, on the basis of the peace treaties, and of the I of Malaya, the Englishmen. This common property, of course, gave rise to constant touches and complications, which, especially for us, small and newly reborn that we were, brought great concern. On. this situation was put to an end in 1824. In that year, we entered into an agreement with England, which is known under the name of London Cycl Traktaat. We then gave, to England, our possessions on the Malacca Peninsula; and England, for our benefit, renounced his possessions on the island of Sumatra.
This agreement, considered by itself, undoubtedly deserved the acclaim of every Dutchman. But it was concluded under conditions which could not claim that praise. The agreement released us from a great danger, its conditions met with us a different, no less great, danger. We escaped Charijbdis, but fell on Scijlla.
Here's why.
England wanted, of course, because this was of great importance to his people, to keep his free trade on the rich Aceh. It would, however, be very dangerous to lose it if it left us unconditionally.
First of all, this danger would then threaten on the part of Aceh. For Aceh was, history testifies to this, a predatory state of excellence. So, on the coasts and in the waters of North-Sumatra, the security of the defenseless trading ships had to be guarded. England, therefore, did not want to renounce his right to watch for that safety, except on condition that we take that task upon ourselves.
Secondly, if it left Sumatra unconditionally to us, England would also be served by us with the loss of its free Aceh trade. For we were equipped with a commercial policy, which was advantageous for our state treasury, but detrimental to our trade. If, therefore, we might become the master of Aceh, then our toll area would also extend over this Empire, and then the English trade on Aceh would have to share in all the objections which our trade experienced. England, therefore, did not want to give up its claims to Sumatra, except on the condition that we would commit ourselves, not to become a master of Aceh, to respect the independence of Aceh.
We have agreed to these two conditions, stated by England. We have, with the London Traktaat, connected with England, to arrange our relations with Atsin, that this state, without losing any of its independence, would give shipping and trade security. And with this connection now, we have done wrong. It was certainly no more than fairness for England, that it, his possessions on the island of Sumatra, exchanging against our possessions on the Malaya Peninsula, did not lose sight of the interests of his people. But we should have guaranteed the freedom of English trade in other ways than those to which we associated ourselves with the Londeusch Tractate. We should have done what we had done since then. We had to change our trade policy to liberal principles. We would have been spared, for the dangers, the worries, and the precious sacrifices, which had been the inevitable consequence of a bond that was impossible to fulfill.
Because the task that we had taken upon ourselves at the London Traktaat was not feasible. Our compatriots, who made this agreement, did not take the necessary account of the character of the peoples of our Archipelago. The native, however, lives in a state of childhood, for which not only the cares, but also the discipline of guardianship are indispensable. It is not enough for us, for his formation, to tell him and to tell him what he, in the interest of himself and of the general, has to do and to let. We must also be able to force him to do so. If we can not do this, we are opposed to liem without authority, then lnj will always behave, according to the will of his princes or chiefs, for whom he cherishes indescribable respect. And native princes are autocrats or despots, whose religion, manners and customs; whose personal interests, interests and needs are in line with the demands of a civilized Society, which emphasizes the general interest and freedom. Hence therefore. that we, at every touch with native states, had to experience enmity in the beginning. The princes refused us because they saw their personal advantage threatened by our social institutions, and their slave subjects also failed us as a result. We have, always and everywhere, forced the native to violently, to slay the slave-yoke, and to enjoy the benefits of civilization.
The task which we associated with the London Traktaat was therefore impossible, on the basis of a rule which, notwithstanding an experience of more than two centuries, had never provided for an exception. Aceh was a state that exercised the horrific business of sea and beach robbery, since human memory, on a large scale. How could we connect now, to make sure that this robbery and murdered state, without losing anything of its independence, so that it would be done without violence, would abandon its old, never restrained heartbeat?
All our amicable discourses and exhortations, therefore, led to the natural consequence that the Atlīnians soon regarded us as impotent to demand what we so persistently asked in vain. More than ever they celebrated their shameful heartbreak. Our archives of the years that followed the conclusion of the London Traktaat were filled with complaints from all our authorities in Sumatra, about the robes of the Acehese, and about the impudence with which they committed them.
We can form some idea of that impudence if we take note of the following event.
In June 1836 our war schooner Dolphijn was traveling, and with 30,000 grout on board, by the native crew of the vessel overrun. The ship was thus lost. Z. M. Corvette Van Speijk was sent to track it down, and found it at Aceh. The commander of our corvette asked the Sultan, the delivery of the schooner. But the Sultan refused, as a reason, that the commander was not provided with a power from the Governor General to receive the vessel.
The Government now sent a commission to Aceh to send a letter from the Supreme Lord, to the Sultan, requesting that the schooner, the stolen legal property of our Government, be delivered. But the commission also returned unjustly. The Sultan now asserted that the schooner had meanwhile been burned. He kept the money and the guns that had been on board for themselves; let the native crew, who had finished the craft, stay under his protection in his country, and referred us, with our advertising, to the Sultan of Turkey.
Worse than to have to lose a war ship in such a way was the hard necessity for us to leave the Sultan of Aceh unpunished. Our Government backed away, for the possibility of a war with Aceh. The war can violate the independence of the state, to which it is explained. And we had committed ourselves, against England, to restrain his predatory desire, while maintaining Aceh's integrity.
In the meantime, as long as we had only to complain about Aceh, and so we only suffered the damage of an impossible future connection, for so long also our difficulties and worries of a domestic nature remained. But when other Powers, and even England, had to experience that trade and shipping in Atsin were unsafe, that we fell short of the obligations that we had taken upon us at the Tract of London, then our business got a whole other, a questionable sight.
In 1831, the Acehnes plundered the American ship, Friendsliip, and killed the captain with some of the crew. In 1844 two British vessels became the prey of their predatory desire. In 1851 the Neapolitan vessel Clementine underwent the same fate. In 1852 the turn came to the English schooner Conry Castle.
All these events were, of course, the cause that the Powers concerned came to us constantly, with as serious as regular complaints. And thus a state of life had gradually been set up, with which not only our peace and security in the Colonies, but also our good relations, yes, even our peace with the Western States were constantly threatened. Such a state of affairs had to come to an end. Our holiest people's interests demanded this imperative. But how to arrive at such a result, without strength of arms, as the London Tract commanded us?
Possibly there was still a chance.
We had committed ourselves, for the security of Aceh, but Aceh did not undertake to give that safety. We could not, therefore, justify our arguments to bring back this kingdom of its robbery and murder, except in the moral claims of humanity, of civilization, and of the general interest. Such claims could, of course, hardly apply in a country such as Aceh, where barbarism, ignorance, and personal advantage were at the forefront.
If, therefore, we succeeded in persuading the Sultan to make a treaty with us, in which he himself made a covenant, to respect the principles of the London Tractate, the task which we had charged upon us in this tract would certainly be less impracticable. to become. We could demand, at least, and possibly with more fruit, the safety which we had so far had to ask in vain. We could appeal to a promise made.
The Indian Government therefore decided to take the plea in such a way. Her attempts, used for this purpose, were crowned with favorable results. In 1857 we entered into a treaty with the Sultan of Atsen, who not only undertook to live in peace and friendship with us, but also to guard against sea and people robbery in his area, strictly and with all available means, or in the seas of its territory, or in the seas of other countries, where its influence applied.
The fourth and fifth articles of this treatise are worded as follows:
ARTICLE 4.
The Dutch Indian Government and His Highness the Sultan of Aceh. waive all claims and claims that arose before the conclusion of this agreement, in respect of disputes of any kind whatsoever.
Furthermore, it is established that when this agreement is concluded, all these disputes and claims are fully settled and destroyed, so that they can never be discussed again.
ARTICLE 5.
The Dutch East Indies Government, and His Highness the Sultan of Aceh, furthermore agree to be strict, and with all their means, to ensure that there are no pirates or murderers in their area, or in the seas of their territory, or of other lands. where they have influence.
From both sides this will be prevented, and will be punished the one who commits such deeds.
No shelter or protection will be granted from either side to anyone who is involved in such matters, not even to his vessel.
There will be no license from either side for people, vessels or goods brought in by their pirates, or offered for sale in their territory.
Here it is, true, simple and concise, but nevertheless correct, story of the causes that our Aceh-Traktaat 1857 brought into being. With this treatise, the history of our relations with Aceh entered a new era. We, with mutual consent, had settled with the past forever. All disputes were settled, all claims were destroyed. They never could ever be discussed again. Aceh had not only promised us peace, friendship and good understanding, but also the most possible safety for people and goods. Let us now see how Aceh fulfilled his promise.
Countrymen! in order to judge, about the necessity or necessity of our war against Aceh, we must of course be known:
1. with the causes which led to the war;
2. with the circumstances under which the war started and conducted; and
3. with the consequences that this war can bring.
I will endeavor, in order to show you a few things in advance.
In the year 1857 we concluded a Traktaat with Aceh. I must begin by telling you the history of this tract. For her knowledge is absolutely necessary, in order to be able to judge with accuracy the events and conditions which at last have created our war.
When, after the fall of France's first Emperor, we returned to the line of independent states, we had to possess the island of Sumatra, on the basis of the peace treaties, and of the I of Malaya, the Englishmen. This common property, of course, gave rise to constant touches and complications, which, especially for us, small and newly reborn that we were, brought great concern. On. this situation was put to an end in 1824. In that year, we entered into an agreement with England, which is known under the name of London Cycl Traktaat. We then gave, to England, our possessions on the Malacca Peninsula; and England, for our benefit, renounced his possessions on the island of Sumatra.
This agreement, considered by itself, undoubtedly deserved the acclaim of every Dutchman. But it was concluded under conditions which could not claim that praise. The agreement released us from a great danger, its conditions met with us a different, no less great, danger. We escaped Charijbdis, but fell on Scijlla.
Here's why.
England wanted, of course, because this was of great importance to his people, to keep his free trade on the rich Aceh. It would, however, be very dangerous to lose it if it left us unconditionally.
First of all, this danger would then threaten on the part of Aceh. For Aceh was, history testifies to this, a predatory state of excellence. So, on the coasts and in the waters of North-Sumatra, the security of the defenseless trading ships had to be guarded. England, therefore, did not want to renounce his right to watch for that safety, except on condition that we take that task upon ourselves.
Secondly, if it left Sumatra unconditionally to us, England would also be served by us with the loss of its free Aceh trade. For we were equipped with a commercial policy, which was advantageous for our state treasury, but detrimental to our trade. If, therefore, we might become the master of Aceh, then our toll area would also extend over this Empire, and then the English trade on Aceh would have to share in all the objections which our trade experienced. England, therefore, did not want to give up its claims to Sumatra, except on the condition that we would commit ourselves, not to become a master of Aceh, to respect the independence of Aceh.
We have agreed to these two conditions, stated by England. We have, with the London Traktaat, connected with England, to arrange our relations with Atsin, that this state, without losing any of its independence, would give shipping and trade security. And with this connection now, we have done wrong. It was certainly no more than fairness for England, that it, his possessions on the island of Sumatra, exchanging against our possessions on the Malaya Peninsula, did not lose sight of the interests of his people. But we should have guaranteed the freedom of English trade in other ways than those to which we associated ourselves with the Londeusch Tractate. We should have done what we had done since then. We had to change our trade policy to liberal principles. We would have been spared, for the dangers, the worries, and the precious sacrifices, which had been the inevitable consequence of a bond that was impossible to fulfill.
Because the task that we had taken upon ourselves at the London Traktaat was not feasible. Our compatriots, who made this agreement, did not take the necessary account of the character of the peoples of our Archipelago. The native, however, lives in a state of childhood, for which not only the cares, but also the discipline of guardianship are indispensable. It is not enough for us, for his formation, to tell him and to tell him what he, in the interest of himself and of the general, has to do and to let. We must also be able to force him to do so. If we can not do this, we are opposed to liem without authority, then lnj will always behave, according to the will of his princes or chiefs, for whom he cherishes indescribable respect. And native princes are autocrats or despots, whose religion, manners and customs; whose personal interests, interests and needs are in line with the demands of a civilized Society, which emphasizes the general interest and freedom. Hence therefore. that we, at every touch with native states, had to experience enmity in the beginning. The princes refused us because they saw their personal advantage threatened by our social institutions, and their slave subjects also failed us as a result. We have, always and everywhere, forced the native to violently, to slay the slave-yoke, and to enjoy the benefits of civilization.
The task which we associated with the London Traktaat was therefore impossible, on the basis of a rule which, notwithstanding an experience of more than two centuries, had never provided for an exception. Aceh was a state that exercised the horrific business of sea and beach robbery, since human memory, on a large scale. How could we connect now, to make sure that this robbery and murdered state, without losing anything of its independence, so that it would be done without violence, would abandon its old, never restrained heartbeat?
All our amicable discourses and exhortations, therefore, led to the natural consequence that the Atlīnians soon regarded us as impotent to demand what we so persistently asked in vain. More than ever they celebrated their shameful heartbreak. Our archives of the years that followed the conclusion of the London Traktaat were filled with complaints from all our authorities in Sumatra, about the robes of the Acehese, and about the impudence with which they committed them.
We can form some idea of that impudence if we take note of the following event.
In June 1836 our war schooner Dolphijn was traveling, and with 30,000 grout on board, by the native crew of the vessel overrun. The ship was thus lost. Z. M. Corvette Van Speijk was sent to track it down, and found it at Aceh. The commander of our corvette asked the Sultan, the delivery of the schooner. But the Sultan refused, as a reason, that the commander was not provided with a power from the Governor General to receive the vessel.
The Government now sent a commission to Aceh to send a letter from the Supreme Lord, to the Sultan, requesting that the schooner, the stolen legal property of our Government, be delivered. But the commission also returned unjustly. The Sultan now asserted that the schooner had meanwhile been burned. He kept the money and the guns that had been on board for themselves; let the native crew, who had finished the craft, stay under his protection in his country, and referred us, with our advertising, to the Sultan of Turkey.
Worse than to have to lose a war ship in such a way was the hard necessity for us to leave the Sultan of Aceh unpunished. Our Government backed away, for the possibility of a war with Aceh. The war can violate the independence of the state, to which it is explained. And we had committed ourselves, against England, to restrain his predatory desire, while maintaining Aceh's integrity.
In the meantime, as long as we had only to complain about Aceh, and so we only suffered the damage of an impossible future connection, for so long also our difficulties and worries of a domestic nature remained. But when other Powers, and even England, had to experience that trade and shipping in Atsin were unsafe, that we fell short of the obligations that we had taken upon us at the Tract of London, then our business got a whole other, a questionable sight.
In 1831, the Acehnes plundered the American ship, Friendsliip, and killed the captain with some of the crew. In 1844 two British vessels became the prey of their predatory desire. In 1851 the Neapolitan vessel Clementine underwent the same fate. In 1852 the turn came to the English schooner Conry Castle.
All these events were, of course, the cause that the Powers concerned came to us constantly, with as serious as regular complaints. And thus a state of life had gradually been set up, with which not only our peace and security in the Colonies, but also our good relations, yes, even our peace with the Western States were constantly threatened. Such a state of affairs had to come to an end. Our holiest people's interests demanded this imperative. But how to arrive at such a result, without strength of arms, as the London Tract commanded us?
Possibly there was still a chance.
We had committed ourselves, for the security of Aceh, but Aceh did not undertake to give that safety. We could not, therefore, justify our arguments to bring back this kingdom of its robbery and murder, except in the moral claims of humanity, of civilization, and of the general interest. Such claims could, of course, hardly apply in a country such as Aceh, where barbarism, ignorance, and personal advantage were at the forefront.
If, therefore, we succeeded in persuading the Sultan to make a treaty with us, in which he himself made a covenant, to respect the principles of the London Tractate, the task which we had charged upon us in this tract would certainly be less impracticable. to become. We could demand, at least, and possibly with more fruit, the safety which we had so far had to ask in vain. We could appeal to a promise made.
The Indian Government therefore decided to take the plea in such a way. Her attempts, used for this purpose, were crowned with favorable results. In 1857 we entered into a treaty with the Sultan of Atsen, who not only undertook to live in peace and friendship with us, but also to guard against sea and people robbery in his area, strictly and with all available means, or in the seas of its territory, or in the seas of other countries, where its influence applied.
The fourth and fifth articles of this treatise are worded as follows:
ARTICLE 4.
The Dutch Indian Government and His Highness the Sultan of Aceh. waive all claims and claims that arose before the conclusion of this agreement, in respect of disputes of any kind whatsoever.
Furthermore, it is established that when this agreement is concluded, all these disputes and claims are fully settled and destroyed, so that they can never be discussed again.
ARTICLE 5.
The Dutch East Indies Government, and His Highness the Sultan of Aceh, furthermore agree to be strict, and with all their means, to ensure that there are no pirates or murderers in their area, or in the seas of their territory, or of other lands. where they have influence.
From both sides this will be prevented, and will be punished the one who commits such deeds.
No shelter or protection will be granted from either side to anyone who is involved in such matters, not even to his vessel.
There will be no license from either side for people, vessels or goods brought in by their pirates, or offered for sale in their territory.
Here it is, true, simple and concise, but nevertheless correct, story of the causes that our Aceh-Traktaat 1857 brought into being. With this treatise, the history of our relations with Aceh entered a new era. We, with mutual consent, had settled with the past forever. All disputes were settled, all claims were destroyed. They never could ever be discussed again. Aceh had not only promised us peace, friendship and good understanding, but also the most possible safety for people and goods. Let us now see how Aceh fulfilled his promise.
Comments